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    <title>Qubes OS</title>
    <description>Qubes is a security-oriented, free and open-source operating system for personal computers that allows you to securely compartmentalize your digital life.
</description>
    <link>https://www.qubes-os.org/</link>
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    <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 03:59:24 +0000</pubDate>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 03:59:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <item>
        <title>QSB-124: Partial filtering bypass in split-gpg2</title>
        <description>&lt;p&gt;We have published &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/5ac7d837cdd0777d982db257e15252e7a9cae7cb/QSBs/qsb-124-2026.txt&quot;&gt;Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 124: Partial filtering bypass in split-gpg2&lt;/a&gt;. The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;qubes-security-bulletin-124&quot;&gt;Qubes Security Bulletin 124&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;
             ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 124 ]===---

                             2026-11-13

                Partial filtering bypass in split-gpg2

User action
------------

Continue to update normally via the Qubes Update tool or its
command-line equivalents [1] in order to apply the security updates
described in the &quot;Patching&quot; section below.

Summary
--------

Split-gpg2 filters incoming gpg-agent commands by parsing them and then
reconstructing allowed commands, in some cases by removing or replacing
some of their parts. Due to a bug, it is possible for lines to be sent
that exceed the line length limit of the protocol. Combined with GnuPG&apos;s
handling of such overlong lines, this allows commands to be injected
that split-gpg2&apos;s filtering would normally not allow.

Impact
-------

In the supported split-gpg2 configuration, a malicious qube can cause
the gpg-agent to display a password prompt with arbitrary text and
receive the response that the user enters. Such a prompt would have the
window borders of the backend (for example, vault) qube, so an attacker
could use this to try to trick the user into entering a passphrase.

However, if the user&apos;s PGP key does not have a passphrase, then such a
request might not make sense (e.g., the user might be confused about the
passphrase being requested and may not have one to provide). Moreover,
in the supported configuration, the vulnerability under discussion does
not allow for extracting or manipulating secret keys, since split-gpg2
uses an &quot;extra&quot; gpg-agent socket that has limited capabilities.
Therefore, even if the user&apos;s PGP key does have a passphrase, and even
if the attacker manages to steal that passphrase, the passphrase should
be useless to the attacker without the secret key.

In theory, this vulnerability could also be used to exploit some further
hypothetical GnuPG vulnerability that normally would have been prevented
by split-gpg2&apos;s filtering.

Affected systems
-----------------

All supported Qubes OS releases are affected. Only users of split-gpg2
(i.e., the `split-gpg2` package) are affected. All recent versions of
split-gpg2 are affected.

Note: split-gpg2 is a distinct component from split-gpg1 (i.e., the
`qubes-gpg-split` package).

Technical details
------------------

When checking incoming &quot;D&quot; commands in response to an &quot;INQUIRY&quot; from the
gpg-agent, split-gpg2 allows unescaped &quot;%&quot; characters. When sending
these to the gpg-agent, split-gpg2 correctly escapes them (&quot;%25&quot;) as
required by the protocol. This increases the lengths of lines containing
such characters. Therefore, split-gpg2 can send lines that exceed the
line length limit (which it correctly checks on incoming lines).

When receiving overlong lines, the behavior of GnuPG&apos;s gpg-agent
implementation depends on the context. For normal commands, they are
treated as fatal errors. However, for &quot;INQUIRY&quot; responses, the command
that initiated the &quot;INQUIRY&quot; is simply aborted with an error response.
The part of the line exceeding the limit is then treated as a new line
that is parsed normally as a command.

While the vulnerability under discussion does not allow an attacker to
extract secret keys in the supported configuration, it is possible for
the user to manually set up an unsupported configuration that does allow
an attacker to extract secret keys. In particular, the user can enable
the `allow_keygen` option in the split-gpg2 config, as documented in the
README [5]:

    ## Allow key generation

    By setting `allow_keygen = yes` in `qubes-split-gpg2.conf` you can
    allow the client to generate new keys. Normal usage should not need
    this.

    **Warning**: This feature is new and not much tested. Therefore it&apos;s
    not security supported!

Again, as stated in the quoted text above, this configuration is not
security supported. It is mentionned here only for the sake of
completeness.

Patching
---------

The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:

  For Qubes 4.3, in templates used for split-gpg2:
  - split-gpg2 package, version 1.1.16

These packages will migrate from the security-testing repositories to
the current (stable) repositories after being tested by the community.
This testing period is intended to catch bugs affecting Qubes OS
stability before the packages reach the broader userbase. By default,
the security-testing repositories are disabled in both dom0 and
templates. If you wish to receive security updates faster at the risk of
encountering more bugs, you can enable the security-testing repositories
either temporarily (for a single update) or permanently. [2] Dom0,
templates, and standalones each have their own security-testing
repositories, which can be enabled independently of one another. [3][4]
If you do not have the relevant security-testing repositories enabled
while security updates are in security-testing, you must wait until they
migrate to the current (stable) repositories, which generally takes one
to two weeks but may be expedited in urgent cases. Once the packages are
available to your Qubes OS system, you should install them as described
in the &quot;User action&quot; section above.

After you have installed the packages listed above, you must shut down
the relevant templates and restart all split-gpg2 backend qubes.

Credits
--------

This issue was reported by Atrate.

References
-----------

[1] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html
[2] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html#updates
[3] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/advanced-topics/how-to-install-software-in-dom0.html#testing-repositories
[4] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-install-software.html#testing-repositories
[5] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-app-linux-split-gpg2/blob/main/README.md

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Source:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/5ac7d837cdd0777d982db257e15252e7a9cae7cb/QSBs/qsb-124-2026.txt&quot;&gt;qsb-124-2026.txt&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;marek-marczykowski-góreckis-pgp-signature&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-górecki&quot;&gt;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki&lt;/a&gt;’s PGP signature&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=QjNH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Source:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/5ac7d837cdd0777d982db257e15252e7a9cae7cb/QSBs/qsb-124-2026.txt.sig.marmarek&quot;&gt;qsb-124-2026.txt.sig.marmarek&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;simon-gaiser-aka-hw42s-pgp-signature&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42&quot;&gt;Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)&lt;/a&gt;’s PGP signature&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=gBjb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Source:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/5ac7d837cdd0777d982db257e15252e7a9cae7cb/QSBs/qsb-124-2026.txt.sig.simon&quot;&gt;qsb-124-2026.txt.sig.simon&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;what-is-the-purpose-of-this-announcement&quot;&gt;What is the purpose of this announcement?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;what-is-a-qubes-security-bulletin-qsb&quot;&gt;What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/&quot;&gt;Qubes security bulletin (QSB)&lt;/a&gt; is a security announcement issued by the &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security.html#qubes-security-team&quot;&gt;Qubes security team&lt;/a&gt;. A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;why-should-i-care-about-qsbs&quot;&gt;Why should I care about QSBs?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html&quot;&gt;updating normally&lt;/a&gt;. However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;what-are-the-pgp-signatures-that-accompany-qsbs&quot;&gt;What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A &lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy&quot;&gt;PGP&lt;/a&gt; signature is a cryptographic &lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature&quot;&gt;digital signature&lt;/a&gt; made in accordance with the &lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP&quot;&gt;OpenPGP&lt;/a&gt; standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like &lt;a href=&quot;https://gnupg.org/&quot;&gt;GNU Privacy Guard (GPG)&lt;/a&gt;. The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;why-should-i-care-whether-a-qsb-is-authentic&quot;&gt;Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;how-do-i-verify-the-pgp-signatures-on-a-qsb&quot;&gt;How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;git&lt;/code&gt; and &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg&lt;/code&gt; installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#openpgp-software&quot;&gt;OpenPGP software&lt;/a&gt;.)&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--fetch-keys&lt;/span&gt; https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: directory &apos;/home/user/.gnupg&apos; created
gpg: keybox &apos;/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx&apos; created
gpg: requesting key from &apos;https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc&apos;
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key &quot;Qubes Master Signing Key&quot; imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg:               imported: 1
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;

    &lt;p&gt;(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key&quot;&gt;How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key&lt;/a&gt;.)&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg&amp;gt;&lt;/code&gt; indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--edit-key&lt;/span&gt; 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;Copyright &lt;span class=&quot;o&quot;&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;C&lt;span class=&quot;o&quot;&gt;)&lt;/span&gt; 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
   
   
pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: unknown       validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
   
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;gpg&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;fpr
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;pub   rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
 Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Important:&lt;/strong&gt; At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you &lt;em&gt;must&lt;/em&gt; authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. &lt;strong&gt;Do not skip this step!&lt;/strong&gt; The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from &lt;em&gt;multiple independent sources in several different ways&lt;/em&gt; and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key&quot;&gt;How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Tip:&lt;/strong&gt; After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;q&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;gpg&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;trust
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: unknown       validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
   
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users&apos; keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
   
  1 = I don&apos;t know or won&apos;t say
  2 = I do NOT trust
  3 = I trust marginally
  4 = I trust fully
  5 = I trust ultimately
  m = back to the main menu
   
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
   
pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: ultimate      validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
   
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;gpg&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;q
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;Cloning into &apos;qubes-secpack&apos;...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Import the included PGP keys. (See our &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security-pack.html#pgp-key-policies&quot;&gt;PGP key policies&lt;/a&gt; for important information about these keys.)&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--import&lt;/span&gt; qubes-secpack/keys/&lt;span class=&quot;k&quot;&gt;*&lt;/span&gt;/&lt;span class=&quot;k&quot;&gt;*&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)&quot; imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key &quot;HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key &quot;Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)&quot; imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key &quot;Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key &quot;Brennan Novak (Qubes Website &amp;amp; Documentation Signing)&quot; imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key &quot;Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key &quot;Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key &quot;Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key &quot;unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key &quot;Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)&quot; imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key &quot;Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: &quot;Qubes Master Signing Key&quot; not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key &quot;Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key&quot; imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)&quot; imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key &quot;Qubes OS Security Team&quot; imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key &quot;Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)&quot; imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg:               imported: 16
gpg:              unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3  completes needed: 1  trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0  valid:   1  signed:   6  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1  valid:   6  signed:   0  trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Verify signed Git tags.&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;nb&quot;&gt;cd &lt;/span&gt;qubes-secpack/
&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;git tag &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;-v&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class=&quot;sb&quot;&gt;`&lt;/span&gt;git describe&lt;span class=&quot;sb&quot;&gt;`&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
   
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;

    &lt;p&gt;The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg: Good signature from...&lt;/code&gt; followed by an appropriate key. The &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;[full]&lt;/code&gt; indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;nb&quot;&gt;cd &lt;/span&gt;QSBs/
&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--verify&lt;/span&gt; qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--verify&lt;/span&gt; qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;nb&quot;&gt;cd&lt;/span&gt; ../canaries/
&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--verify&lt;/span&gt; canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--verify&lt;/span&gt; canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;

    &lt;p&gt;Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg --verify&lt;/code&gt; command should always start with &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg: Good signature from...&lt;/code&gt; followed by an appropriate key.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For this announcement (QSB-124), the commands are:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;$ gpg --verify qsb-124-2026.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-124-2026.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-124-2026.txt.sig.simon qsb-124-2026.txt
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-124 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
        <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
        <link>https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/14/qsb-124/</link>
        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/14/qsb-124/</guid>
        
        
        <category>security</category>
        
      </item>
    
      <item>
        <title>XSAs released on 2026-11-10</title>
        <description>&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href=&quot;https://xenproject.org/&quot;&gt;Xen Project&lt;/a&gt; has released one or more &lt;a href=&quot;https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/&quot;&gt;Xen security advisories (XSAs)&lt;/a&gt;.
The security of Qubes OS &lt;strong&gt;is affected&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;xsas-that-do-affect-the-security-of-qubes-os&quot;&gt;XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The following XSAs &lt;strong&gt;do affect&lt;/strong&gt; the security of Qubes OS:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-524.html&quot;&gt;XSA-524&lt;/a&gt;: See &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/10/qsb-123/&quot;&gt;QSB-123&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-525.html&quot;&gt;XSA-525&lt;/a&gt;: See &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/10/qsb-123/&quot;&gt;QSB-123&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;xsas-that-do-not-affect-the-security-of-qubes-os&quot;&gt;XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The following XSAs &lt;strong&gt;do not affect&lt;/strong&gt; the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-529.html&quot;&gt;XSA-529&lt;/a&gt;: Qubes OS does not use XAPI.&lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-530.html&quot;&gt;XSA-530&lt;/a&gt;: Qubes OS does not use XAPI.&lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-531.html&quot;&gt;XSA-531&lt;/a&gt;: Denial of service only.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;xsas-that-are-still-under-investigation&quot;&gt;XSAs that are still under investigation&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The Qubes security team is still analyzing the security implications of the following XSA:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-532.html&quot;&gt;XSA-532&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Once the status of this XSA has been determined, we will update this announcement and the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/&quot;&gt;XSA tracker&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;about-this-announcement&quot;&gt;About this announcement&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Qubes OS uses the &lt;a href=&quot;https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview&quot;&gt;Xen hypervisor&lt;/a&gt; as part of its &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/developer/system/architecture.html&quot;&gt;architecture&lt;/a&gt;. When the &lt;a href=&quot;https://xenproject.org/&quot;&gt;Xen Project&lt;/a&gt; publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a &lt;a href=&quot;https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/&quot;&gt;Xen security advisory (XSA)&lt;/a&gt;. Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/&quot;&gt;Qubes security bulletin (QSB)&lt;/a&gt;. (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only &lt;em&gt;positive&lt;/em&gt; confirmation that certain XSAs &lt;em&gt;do&lt;/em&gt; affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide &lt;em&gt;negative&lt;/em&gt; confirmation that other XSAs do &lt;em&gt;not&lt;/em&gt; affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/&quot;&gt;XSA tracker&lt;/a&gt;, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
        <link>https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/10/xsas-released-on-2026-11-10/</link>
        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/10/xsas-released-on-2026-11-10/</guid>
        
        
        <category>security</category>
        
      </item>
    
      <item>
        <title>QSB-123: AMD CPU vulnerabilities (XSA-524, XSA-525)</title>
        <description>&lt;p&gt;We have published &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/3f0fdfd1c3c643d9cc3a628d5ba7c377a864deea/QSBs/qsb-123-2026.txt&quot;&gt;Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 123: AMD CPU vulnerabilities (XSA-524, XSA-525)&lt;/a&gt;. The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;qubes-security-bulletin-123&quot;&gt;Qubes Security Bulletin 123&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;
             ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 123 ]===---

                              2026-11-10

              AMD CPU vulnerabilities (XSA-524, XSA-525)

User action
------------

Continue to update normally via the Qubes Update tool or its
command-line equivalents [1] in order to apply the security updates
described in the &quot;Patching&quot; section below.

Summary
--------

On 2026-11-10, the Xen Project published the security advisories below.

XSA-524 [5] &quot;AMD IOMMU Out-of-Bounds Device Table Read&quot;:

| With AMD IOMMUs, the OS or Hypervisor chooses the position and size of
| the Device Table, which holds the main configuration information for
| devices.
|
| AMD have disclosed a vulnerability in some IOMMUs, whereby under
| specific circumstances they read beyond the size chosen by the OS or
| Hypervisor.  This gets interpreted as valid configuration data for
| certain devices.
|
| For more information, see:
|   https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3060.html

XSA-525 [6] &quot;x86: Transient Scheduler Attacks (update)&quot;:

| AMD have discovered further properties of Transient Scheduler Attacks.
|
| The previously published XSA-471 dealt with two TSA variants, TSA-SQ
| and TSA-L1 on Zen3 and Zen4 CPUs.  For details, see XSA-471.
|
| AMD had previously said that Zen5 CPUs were not vulnerable to TSA-SQ and
| TSA-L1.  This statement has been corrected, and is being tracked as
| AMD-SB-7073 using the existing CVE-2024-36350 and CVE-2024-36357.
|
| AMD have also disclosed a new TSA variant, TSA-Fill, which is being
| tracked as AMD-SB-3031 and CVE-2026-0004.
|
| For more information, see:
|   https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-471.html
|   https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/resources/bulletin/technical-guidance-for-mitigating-transient-scheduler-attacks.pdf
|   https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7073.html
|   https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3031.html

Impact
-------

XSA-524: On affected systems, a malicious qube may be able to compromise
Qubes OS by writing to arbitrary memory pages.

XSA-525: On affected systems, a malicious qube may be able to leak data
from other qubes in the system.

Affected systems
-----------------

XSA-524: Some AMD EPYC CPUs are affected (see AMD-SB-3060 [7] for
details). Only systems with a specific device configuration are affected
(see XSA-524 [5] for details).

XSA-525: AMD Zen 5 CPUs are affected.

In both cases, Intel CPUs are not affected.

Patching
---------

The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:

  For Qubes 4.3, in dom0:
  - Xen packages, 4.19.6-4

These packages will migrate from the security-testing repositories to
the current (stable) repositories after being tested by the community.
This testing period is intended to catch bugs affecting Qubes OS
stability before the packages reach the broader userbase. By default,
the security-testing repositories are disabled in both dom0 and
templates. If you wish to receive security updates faster at the risk of
encountering more bugs, you can enable the security-testing repositories
either temporarily (for a single update) or permanently. [2] Dom0,
templates, and standalones each have their own security-testing
repositories, which can be enabled independently of one another. [3][4]
If you do not have the relevant security-testing repositories enabled
while security updates are in security-testing, you must wait until they
migrate to the current (stable) repositories, which generally takes one
to two weeks but may be expedited in urgent cases. Once the packages are
available to your Qubes OS system, you should install them as described
in the &quot;User action&quot; section above.

After you have installed the packages listed above, you must restart
dom0 in order for the security updates to take effect.

If you use Anti Evil Maid, you must reseal your secret passphrase to new
PCR values, as PCR18+19 changes when Xen binaries are updated.

Credits
--------

See the original Xen Security Advisories. [5][6]

References
-----------

[1] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html
[2] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html#updates
[3] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/advanced-topics/how-to-install-software-in-dom0.html#testing-repositories
[4] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-install-software.html#testing-repositories
[5] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-524.html
[6] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-525.html
[7] https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3060.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Source:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/3f0fdfd1c3c643d9cc3a628d5ba7c377a864deea/QSBs/qsb-123-2026.txt&quot;&gt;qsb-123-2026.txt&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;marek-marczykowski-góreckis-pgp-signature&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-górecki&quot;&gt;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki&lt;/a&gt;’s PGP signature&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=SJ9n
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Source:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/3f0fdfd1c3c643d9cc3a628d5ba7c377a864deea/QSBs/qsb-123-2026.txt.sig.marmarek&quot;&gt;qsb-123-2026.txt.sig.marmarek&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;simon-gaiser-aka-hw42s-pgp-signature&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42&quot;&gt;Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)&lt;/a&gt;’s PGP signature&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=w665
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Source:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/3f0fdfd1c3c643d9cc3a628d5ba7c377a864deea/QSBs/qsb-123-2026.txt.sig.simon&quot;&gt;qsb-123-2026.txt.sig.simon&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;what-is-the-purpose-of-this-announcement&quot;&gt;What is the purpose of this announcement?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;what-is-a-qubes-security-bulletin-qsb&quot;&gt;What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/&quot;&gt;Qubes security bulletin (QSB)&lt;/a&gt; is a security announcement issued by the &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security.html#qubes-security-team&quot;&gt;Qubes security team&lt;/a&gt;. A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;why-should-i-care-about-qsbs&quot;&gt;Why should I care about QSBs?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html&quot;&gt;updating normally&lt;/a&gt;. However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;what-are-the-pgp-signatures-that-accompany-qsbs&quot;&gt;What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A &lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy&quot;&gt;PGP&lt;/a&gt; signature is a cryptographic &lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature&quot;&gt;digital signature&lt;/a&gt; made in accordance with the &lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP&quot;&gt;OpenPGP&lt;/a&gt; standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like &lt;a href=&quot;https://gnupg.org/&quot;&gt;GNU Privacy Guard (GPG)&lt;/a&gt;. The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;why-should-i-care-whether-a-qsb-is-authentic&quot;&gt;Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;how-do-i-verify-the-pgp-signatures-on-a-qsb&quot;&gt;How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;git&lt;/code&gt; and &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg&lt;/code&gt; installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#openpgp-software&quot;&gt;OpenPGP software&lt;/a&gt;.)&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--fetch-keys&lt;/span&gt; https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: directory &apos;/home/user/.gnupg&apos; created
gpg: keybox &apos;/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx&apos; created
gpg: requesting key from &apos;https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc&apos;
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key &quot;Qubes Master Signing Key&quot; imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg:               imported: 1
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;

    &lt;p&gt;(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key&quot;&gt;How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key&lt;/a&gt;.)&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg&amp;gt;&lt;/code&gt; indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--edit-key&lt;/span&gt; 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;Copyright &lt;span class=&quot;o&quot;&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;C&lt;span class=&quot;o&quot;&gt;)&lt;/span&gt; 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
   
   
pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: unknown       validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
   
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;gpg&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;fpr
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;pub   rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
 Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Important:&lt;/strong&gt; At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you &lt;em&gt;must&lt;/em&gt; authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. &lt;strong&gt;Do not skip this step!&lt;/strong&gt; The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from &lt;em&gt;multiple independent sources in several different ways&lt;/em&gt; and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key&quot;&gt;How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Tip:&lt;/strong&gt; After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;q&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;gpg&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;trust
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: unknown       validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
   
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users&apos; keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
   
  1 = I don&apos;t know or won&apos;t say
  2 = I do NOT trust
  3 = I trust marginally
  4 = I trust fully
  5 = I trust ultimately
  m = back to the main menu
   
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
   
pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: ultimate      validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
   
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;gpg&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;q
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;Cloning into &apos;qubes-secpack&apos;...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Import the included PGP keys. (See our &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security-pack.html#pgp-key-policies&quot;&gt;PGP key policies&lt;/a&gt; for important information about these keys.)&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--import&lt;/span&gt; qubes-secpack/keys/&lt;span class=&quot;k&quot;&gt;*&lt;/span&gt;/&lt;span class=&quot;k&quot;&gt;*&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)&quot; imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key &quot;HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key &quot;Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)&quot; imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key &quot;Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key &quot;Brennan Novak (Qubes Website &amp;amp; Documentation Signing)&quot; imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key &quot;Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key &quot;Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key &quot;Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key &quot;unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key &quot;Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)&quot; imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key &quot;Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: &quot;Qubes Master Signing Key&quot; not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key &quot;Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key&quot; imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)&quot; imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key &quot;Qubes OS Security Team&quot; imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key &quot;Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)&quot; imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg:               imported: 16
gpg:              unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3  completes needed: 1  trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0  valid:   1  signed:   6  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1  valid:   6  signed:   0  trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Verify signed Git tags.&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;nb&quot;&gt;cd &lt;/span&gt;qubes-secpack/
&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;git tag &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;-v&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class=&quot;sb&quot;&gt;`&lt;/span&gt;git describe&lt;span class=&quot;sb&quot;&gt;`&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
   
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;

    &lt;p&gt;The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg: Good signature from...&lt;/code&gt; followed by an appropriate key. The &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;[full]&lt;/code&gt; indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;nb&quot;&gt;cd &lt;/span&gt;QSBs/
&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--verify&lt;/span&gt; qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--verify&lt;/span&gt; qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;nb&quot;&gt;cd&lt;/span&gt; ../canaries/
&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--verify&lt;/span&gt; canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--verify&lt;/span&gt; canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;

    &lt;p&gt;Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg --verify&lt;/code&gt; command should always start with &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg: Good signature from...&lt;/code&gt; followed by an appropriate key.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For this announcement (QSB-123), the commands are:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;$ gpg --verify qsb-123-2026.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-123-2026.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-123-2026.txt.sig.simon qsb-123-2026.txt
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-123 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
        <link>https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/10/qsb-123/</link>
        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/10/qsb-123/</guid>
        
        
        <category>security</category>
        
      </item>
    
      <item>
        <title>XSAs released on 2026-11-06</title>
        <description>&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href=&quot;https://xenproject.org/&quot;&gt;Xen Project&lt;/a&gt; has released one or more &lt;a href=&quot;https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/&quot;&gt;Xen security advisories (XSAs)&lt;/a&gt;.
The security of Qubes OS is &lt;strong&gt;not&lt;/strong&gt; affected.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;xsas-that-do-affect-the-security-of-qubes-os&quot;&gt;XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The following XSAs &lt;strong&gt;do affect&lt;/strong&gt; the security of Qubes OS:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;(none)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;xsas-that-do-not-affect-the-security-of-qubes-os&quot;&gt;XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The following XSAs &lt;strong&gt;do not affect&lt;/strong&gt; the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-526.html&quot;&gt;XSA-526&lt;/a&gt;: Denial of service only.&lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-527.html&quot;&gt;XSA-527&lt;/a&gt;: Denial of service only.&lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-528.html&quot;&gt;XSA-528&lt;/a&gt;: Denial of service only.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;about-this-announcement&quot;&gt;About this announcement&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Qubes OS uses the &lt;a href=&quot;https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview&quot;&gt;Xen hypervisor&lt;/a&gt; as part of its &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/developer/system/architecture.html&quot;&gt;architecture&lt;/a&gt;. When the &lt;a href=&quot;https://xenproject.org/&quot;&gt;Xen Project&lt;/a&gt; publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a &lt;a href=&quot;https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/&quot;&gt;Xen security advisory (XSA)&lt;/a&gt;. Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/&quot;&gt;Qubes security bulletin (QSB)&lt;/a&gt;. (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only &lt;em&gt;positive&lt;/em&gt; confirmation that certain XSAs &lt;em&gt;do&lt;/em&gt; affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide &lt;em&gt;negative&lt;/em&gt; confirmation that other XSAs do &lt;em&gt;not&lt;/em&gt; affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/&quot;&gt;XSA tracker&lt;/a&gt;, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
        <pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
        <link>https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/08/xsas-released-on-2026-11-06/</link>
        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/08/xsas-released-on-2026-11-06/</guid>
        
        
        <category>security</category>
        
      </item>
    
      <item>
        <title>QSB-122: Package verification bypass in APT (DSA-6607-1)</title>
        <description>&lt;p&gt;We have published &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/07231286f2432d1541d439c87799365096979375/QSBs/qsb-122-2026.txt&quot;&gt;Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 122: Package verification bypass in APT (DSA-6607-1)&lt;/a&gt;. The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;qubes-security-bulletin-122&quot;&gt;Qubes Security Bulletin 122&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;
             ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 122 ]===---

                              2026-11-06

            Package verification bypass in APT (DSA-6607-1)

User action
------------

If you update Qubes OS using the Qubes Update tool, continue to update
normally in order to receive the security updates described in the
&quot;Patching&quot; section below.

If you update Qubes OS using command-line tools instead of the Qubes
Update tool, you must first update dom0 by itself (without any other
qubes) via `qubes-dom0-update` in a dom0 terminal. Only after dom0 has
been successfully updated should you update all Debian and Whonix
templates and standalones via `qubes-vm-update` in a dom0 terminal. (The
Qubes Update tool automatically handles updating in the correct order.)

Do not attempt to update any qube using the `apt` command directly, as
this bypasses built-in Qubes OS update security measures. Use only the
Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents in the order described
above. [1]

After updating dom0 and all Debian and Whonix templates and standalones,
we recommend restarting all Debian and Whonix qubes to ensure the
updates take effect.

Summary
--------

On 2026-11-04, the Debian security team published DSA 6607-1, &quot;apt
security update&quot; (CVE-2026-109518) [3]:
| Max Justicz discovered a vulnerability in the APT package manager. APT
| can merge two different package downloads after an HTTP redirect gives
| them the same URI. Improper file handling when resuming an HTTP
| download allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to replace a package
| after verification, resulting in the execution of arbitrary code as
| root.

Also see &quot;APT-2026-11-01 security update.&quot; [4]

Impact
-------

An attacker who controls an update mirror or who can modify network
traffic can attempt to exploit this vulnerability in order to compromise
Debian and Whonix qubes.

Affected systems
-----------------

Qubes OS systems containing Debian and Whonix qubes are affected.

Qubes OS systems containing only Fedora (or other non-APT-based) qubes
are not affected.

Discussion
-----------

By default, the Advanced Package Tool (APT) verifies downloaded packages
via signed repository metadata. This allows for using package
repositories without having to trust the server hosting them or the
transport method used to download them. The vulnerability under
discussion breaks this mechanism. An attacker who successfully exploits
this vulnerability can manipulate the packages that APT downloads and
installs, potentially leading to complete compromise of the affected
qube. A successful attack requires one or more of the following:

 - The attacker controls the server on which the repository is hosted
   (e.g., a third-party mirror).

 - The transport mechanism is not authenticated (e.g., plain HTTP), and
   the attacker can tamper with the connection to the server.

 - An independent vulnerability allows the attacker to achieve one of
   the above (e.g., exploiting a bug in the server or compromising a
   trusted certificate authority (CA) or a digital certificate issued by
   such an authority).

In Qubes OS, Debian and Whonix qubes use HTTPS for APT repositories by
default, which eliminates the second (man-in-the-middle) attack vector.
(Users who have manually changed their configurations to use plain HTTP
for any repositories are still affected. Users who have manually
installed unofficial APT-based qubes besides Debian and Whonix are also
affected.)

Normally, we do not release Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) to address
vulnerabilities that affect qubes only internally without affecting the
rest of Qubes OS, since such vulnerabilities do not undermine the Qubes
security model. (On the contrary, the security model is built on the
assumption that such vulnerabilities are inevitable.)

However, the vulnerability under discussion is somewhat special. While
it affects qubes only internally, it could allow an attacker to
compromise templates, which are used as a basis for creating other
qubes, such as app and service qubes. If a template is compromised, then
all the qubes based on that template will also be compromised. App qubes
operate directly on user data, and service qubes can affect user privacy
(e.g., Whonix and VPN proxy qubes).

In Qubes OS, we take special precautions to make templates difficult to
compromise. For example, we block all network connections to and from
templates, with one exception: We allow templates to connect to an
&quot;update proxy&quot; that allows the template to retrieve updates while
protecting users from accidentally using templates to perform risky
activities, such as browsing the web.

Since the vulnerability under discussion has the potential to subvert
these defenses, and since we can address it via the Qubes update system,
we&apos;ve decided to issue this QSB and its attendant security updates.

Patching
---------

The packages below contain security updates to the Qubes update tools
that address the vulnerability described in this bulletin. After these
updates are applied, the Qubes update tools will update APT in a safe
way.

  For Qubes 4.3, in dom0:
  - qubes-core-dom0-linux 4.3.25
  - qubes-mgmt-salt-dom0-update 4.3.4

These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages should be installed
as described in the &quot;User action&quot; section above.

Credits
--------

See the Debian and APT security advisories. [3][4]

References
-----------

[1] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html
[2] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html
[3] https://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2026/msg00526.html
[4] https://lists.debian.org/deity/2026/11/msg00005.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Source:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/07231286f2432d1541d439c87799365096979375/QSBs/qsb-122-2026.txt&quot;&gt;qsb-122-2026.txt&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;marek-marczykowski-góreckis-pgp-signature&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-górecki&quot;&gt;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki&lt;/a&gt;’s PGP signature&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmrtJOsACgkQ1lWk8hgw
4Gr4dA/+J3brLV8sxzHtTP/6YxiNXEaLLcq1QLQ8NMuRpo2+zzHT+L16sHYoSiv9
gPiDRJmrQhZEo4WJrjgYSn/VGqcuG4GvZduuNLQJfEw5CZ1jBzE5mmUgI92wth9M
gY2UpzKMp95k+dZEMWl7RZwhs6aT5Sld9O4D4qSlpZpl06iZ6+kX7g0LpCa+Dh/P
8ACo3cjwkiRi3oQos6AIe+oM0ET2iB8cycTwArqn6xgj31HtpF8dhlSK5UiePgfV
4JoWaNthMsu3DTvGmee91jMUXYlEPbChTt8wYlRZEwO6fyYYzGooEbj265W9nB32
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+ooLUOYnFDtOThC0AEflngWPbcWmFbOdWwgbL/qHM8ijhT8TS4MPkukw38R6Skb3
1/xS2hFqUgT5BFlYmnpfBudH0R4KrnG86RetA2gzX9FfCI7l/k8frGkK0NvxsBAE
8G0WbtRBtX9htCsDVVYcDIfaIol7Xvx56mQVEf65MCAFoprJX9NUihFx5QH1uV5i
Pxea8r7jXEKJ6DPnHZpPAUN4Xil7ypfGamYEhayjtUBWWgB8xtzQhnuqNKF6HlSH
MGp/o/wdnRuSpTFoXCNQTPHpFwX0rAzo/qm0cc8hHP8YPgI4Okg=
=mtb+
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Source:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/07231286f2432d1541d439c87799365096979375/QSBs/qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.marmarek&quot;&gt;qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.marmarek&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;simon-gaiser-aka-hw42s-pgp-signature&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42&quot;&gt;Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)&lt;/a&gt;’s PGP signature&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=w6BW
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Source:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/07231286f2432d1541d439c87799365096979375/QSBs/qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.simon&quot;&gt;qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.simon&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;what-is-the-purpose-of-this-announcement&quot;&gt;What is the purpose of this announcement?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;what-is-a-qubes-security-bulletin-qsb&quot;&gt;What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/&quot;&gt;Qubes security bulletin (QSB)&lt;/a&gt; is a security announcement issued by the &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security.html#qubes-security-team&quot;&gt;Qubes security team&lt;/a&gt;. A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;why-should-i-care-about-qsbs&quot;&gt;Why should I care about QSBs?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html&quot;&gt;updating normally&lt;/a&gt;. However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;what-are-the-pgp-signatures-that-accompany-qsbs&quot;&gt;What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A &lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy&quot;&gt;PGP&lt;/a&gt; signature is a cryptographic &lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature&quot;&gt;digital signature&lt;/a&gt; made in accordance with the &lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP&quot;&gt;OpenPGP&lt;/a&gt; standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like &lt;a href=&quot;https://gnupg.org/&quot;&gt;GNU Privacy Guard (GPG)&lt;/a&gt;. The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;why-should-i-care-whether-a-qsb-is-authentic&quot;&gt;Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;how-do-i-verify-the-pgp-signatures-on-a-qsb&quot;&gt;How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;git&lt;/code&gt; and &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg&lt;/code&gt; installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#openpgp-software&quot;&gt;OpenPGP software&lt;/a&gt;.)&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--fetch-keys&lt;/span&gt; https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: directory &apos;/home/user/.gnupg&apos; created
gpg: keybox &apos;/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx&apos; created
gpg: requesting key from &apos;https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc&apos;
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key &quot;Qubes Master Signing Key&quot; imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg:               imported: 1
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;

    &lt;p&gt;(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key&quot;&gt;How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key&lt;/a&gt;.)&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg&amp;gt;&lt;/code&gt; indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--edit-key&lt;/span&gt; 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;Copyright &lt;span class=&quot;o&quot;&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;C&lt;span class=&quot;o&quot;&gt;)&lt;/span&gt; 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
   
   
pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: unknown       validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
   
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;gpg&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;fpr
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;pub   rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
 Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Important:&lt;/strong&gt; At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you &lt;em&gt;must&lt;/em&gt; authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. &lt;strong&gt;Do not skip this step!&lt;/strong&gt; The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from &lt;em&gt;multiple independent sources in several different ways&lt;/em&gt; and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key&quot;&gt;How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Tip:&lt;/strong&gt; After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;q&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;gpg&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;trust
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: unknown       validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
   
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users&apos; keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
   
  1 = I don&apos;t know or won&apos;t say
  2 = I do NOT trust
  3 = I trust marginally
  4 = I trust fully
  5 = I trust ultimately
  m = back to the main menu
   
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
   
pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: ultimate      validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
   
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;gpg&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;q
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;Cloning into &apos;qubes-secpack&apos;...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Import the included PGP keys. (See our &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security-pack.html#pgp-key-policies&quot;&gt;PGP key policies&lt;/a&gt; for important information about these keys.)&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--import&lt;/span&gt; qubes-secpack/keys/&lt;span class=&quot;k&quot;&gt;*&lt;/span&gt;/&lt;span class=&quot;k&quot;&gt;*&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)&quot; imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key &quot;HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key &quot;Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)&quot; imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key &quot;Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key &quot;Brennan Novak (Qubes Website &amp;amp; Documentation Signing)&quot; imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key &quot;Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key &quot;Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key &quot;Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key &quot;unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key &quot;Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)&quot; imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key &quot;Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: &quot;Qubes Master Signing Key&quot; not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key &quot;Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key&quot; imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)&quot; imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key &quot;Qubes OS Security Team&quot; imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key &quot;Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)&quot; imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg:               imported: 16
gpg:              unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3  completes needed: 1  trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0  valid:   1  signed:   6  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1  valid:   6  signed:   0  trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Verify signed Git tags.&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;nb&quot;&gt;cd &lt;/span&gt;qubes-secpack/
&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;git tag &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;-v&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class=&quot;sb&quot;&gt;`&lt;/span&gt;git describe&lt;span class=&quot;sb&quot;&gt;`&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
   
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;

    &lt;p&gt;The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg: Good signature from...&lt;/code&gt; followed by an appropriate key. The &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;[full]&lt;/code&gt; indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;nb&quot;&gt;cd &lt;/span&gt;QSBs/
&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--verify&lt;/span&gt; qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--verify&lt;/span&gt; qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;nb&quot;&gt;cd&lt;/span&gt; ../canaries/
&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--verify&lt;/span&gt; canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--verify&lt;/span&gt; canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;

    &lt;p&gt;Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg --verify&lt;/code&gt; command should always start with &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg: Good signature from...&lt;/code&gt; followed by an appropriate key.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For this announcement (QSB-122), the commands are:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;$ gpg --verify qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-122-2026.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-122-2026.txt.sig.simon qsb-122-2026.txt
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-122 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
        <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
        <link>https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/06/qsb-122/</link>
        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/06/qsb-122/</guid>
        
        
        <category>security</category>
        
      </item>
    
      <item>
        <title>XSAs released on 2026-11-03</title>
        <description>&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href=&quot;https://xenproject.org/&quot;&gt;Xen Project&lt;/a&gt; has released one or more &lt;a href=&quot;https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/&quot;&gt;Xen security advisories (XSAs)&lt;/a&gt;.
The security of Qubes OS &lt;strong&gt;is affected&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;xsas-that-do-affect-the-security-of-qubes-os&quot;&gt;XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The following XSAs &lt;strong&gt;do affect&lt;/strong&gt; the security of Qubes OS:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-523.html&quot;&gt;XSA-523&lt;/a&gt;: See &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/03/qsb-121/&quot;&gt;QSB-121&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;xsas-that-do-not-affect-the-security-of-qubes-os&quot;&gt;XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The following XSAs &lt;strong&gt;do not affect&lt;/strong&gt; the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;(none)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;about-this-announcement&quot;&gt;About this announcement&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Qubes OS uses the &lt;a href=&quot;https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview&quot;&gt;Xen hypervisor&lt;/a&gt; as part of its &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/developer/system/architecture.html&quot;&gt;architecture&lt;/a&gt;. When the &lt;a href=&quot;https://xenproject.org/&quot;&gt;Xen Project&lt;/a&gt; publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a &lt;a href=&quot;https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/&quot;&gt;Xen security advisory (XSA)&lt;/a&gt;. Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/&quot;&gt;Qubes security bulletin (QSB)&lt;/a&gt;. (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only &lt;em&gt;positive&lt;/em&gt; confirmation that certain XSAs &lt;em&gt;do&lt;/em&gt; affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide &lt;em&gt;negative&lt;/em&gt; confirmation that other XSAs do &lt;em&gt;not&lt;/em&gt; affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/&quot;&gt;XSA tracker&lt;/a&gt;, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
        <link>https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/03/xsas-released-on-2026-11-03/</link>
        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/03/xsas-released-on-2026-11-03/</guid>
        
        
        <category>security</category>
        
      </item>
    
      <item>
        <title>QSB-121: Arbitrary read/write via grant copy (XSA-523)</title>
        <description>&lt;p&gt;We have published &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/365d15cb545a9fe2283ab18ae70b62bca89c2dc1/QSBs/qsb-121-2026.txt&quot;&gt;Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 121: Arbitrary read/write via grant copy (XSA-523)&lt;/a&gt;. The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;qubes-security-bulletin-121&quot;&gt;Qubes Security Bulletin 121&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;
             ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 121 ]===---

                              2026-11-03

            Arbitrary read/write via grant copy (XSA-523)

User action
------------

Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the &quot;Patching&quot; section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.

Summary
--------

On 2026-11-03, the Xen Project published XSA-523, &quot;arbitrary
read/write via grant copy&quot; (CVE-2026-102703,CVE-2026-102704) [3]:
| A common access pattern is a batch of Grant Copy operations acting on
| adjacent address ranges in the same source or destination page. For
| performance reasons, Xen caches details internally to reuse already
| validated data. The conditions on when to re-validate the internal
| data were not correct in some cases:
|
|  - Frame numbers and grant references could wrongly be mixed up. This
|    is CVE-2026-102703.
|
|  - Copying by frame number (rather than grant reference) is permitted
|    only when operating on the caller&apos;s own memory. The check to
|    enforce this restriction was misplaced. This is CVE-2026-102704.

Impact
-------

A malicious qube can read and write arbitrary memory belonging to other
qubes, including dom0.

Affected systems
-----------------

All supported Qubes OS releases and configurations are affected.

Patching
---------

The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:

  For Qubes 4.3, in dom0:
  - Xen packages, version 4.19.6-3

These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages should be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]

Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.

If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new Xen
binaries.

Credits
--------

See the original Xen Security Advisory. [3]

References
-----------

[1] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html
[2] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-523.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Source:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/365d15cb545a9fe2283ab18ae70b62bca89c2dc1/QSBs/qsb-121-2026.txt&quot;&gt;qsb-121-2026.txt&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;marek-marczykowski-góreckis-pgp-signature&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-górecki&quot;&gt;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki&lt;/a&gt;’s PGP signature&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=h9rr
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Source:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/365d15cb545a9fe2283ab18ae70b62bca89c2dc1/QSBs/qsb-121-2026.txt.sig.marmarek&quot;&gt;qsb-121-2026.txt.sig.marmarek&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;simon-gaiser-aka-hw42s-pgp-signature&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42&quot;&gt;Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)&lt;/a&gt;’s PGP signature&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=yfXw
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Source:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/365d15cb545a9fe2283ab18ae70b62bca89c2dc1/QSBs/qsb-121-2026.txt.sig.simon&quot;&gt;qsb-121-2026.txt.sig.simon&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;what-is-the-purpose-of-this-announcement&quot;&gt;What is the purpose of this announcement?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;what-is-a-qubes-security-bulletin-qsb&quot;&gt;What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/&quot;&gt;Qubes security bulletin (QSB)&lt;/a&gt; is a security announcement issued by the &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security.html#qubes-security-team&quot;&gt;Qubes security team&lt;/a&gt;. A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;why-should-i-care-about-qsbs&quot;&gt;Why should I care about QSBs?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html&quot;&gt;updating normally&lt;/a&gt;. However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;what-are-the-pgp-signatures-that-accompany-qsbs&quot;&gt;What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A &lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy&quot;&gt;PGP&lt;/a&gt; signature is a cryptographic &lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature&quot;&gt;digital signature&lt;/a&gt; made in accordance with the &lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP&quot;&gt;OpenPGP&lt;/a&gt; standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like &lt;a href=&quot;https://gnupg.org/&quot;&gt;GNU Privacy Guard (GPG)&lt;/a&gt;. The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;why-should-i-care-whether-a-qsb-is-authentic&quot;&gt;Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;how-do-i-verify-the-pgp-signatures-on-a-qsb&quot;&gt;How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;git&lt;/code&gt; and &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg&lt;/code&gt; installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#openpgp-software&quot;&gt;OpenPGP software&lt;/a&gt;.)&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--fetch-keys&lt;/span&gt; https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: directory &apos;/home/user/.gnupg&apos; created
gpg: keybox &apos;/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx&apos; created
gpg: requesting key from &apos;https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc&apos;
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key &quot;Qubes Master Signing Key&quot; imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg:               imported: 1
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;

    &lt;p&gt;(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key&quot;&gt;How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key&lt;/a&gt;.)&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg&amp;gt;&lt;/code&gt; indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--edit-key&lt;/span&gt; 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;Copyright &lt;span class=&quot;o&quot;&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;C&lt;span class=&quot;o&quot;&gt;)&lt;/span&gt; 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
   
   
pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: unknown       validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
   
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;gpg&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;fpr
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;pub   rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
 Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Important:&lt;/strong&gt; At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you &lt;em&gt;must&lt;/em&gt; authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. &lt;strong&gt;Do not skip this step!&lt;/strong&gt; The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from &lt;em&gt;multiple independent sources in several different ways&lt;/em&gt; and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key&quot;&gt;How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Tip:&lt;/strong&gt; After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;q&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;gpg&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;trust
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: unknown       validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
   
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users&apos; keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
   
  1 = I don&apos;t know or won&apos;t say
  2 = I do NOT trust
  3 = I trust marginally
  4 = I trust fully
  5 = I trust ultimately
  m = back to the main menu
   
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
   
pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
     created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
     trust: ultimate      validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
   
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;gpg&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;q
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;Cloning into &apos;qubes-secpack&apos;...
remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Import the included PGP keys. (See our &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security-pack.html#pgp-key-policies&quot;&gt;PGP key policies&lt;/a&gt; for important information about these keys.)&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--import&lt;/span&gt; qubes-secpack/keys/&lt;span class=&quot;k&quot;&gt;*&lt;/span&gt;/&lt;span class=&quot;k&quot;&gt;*&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)&quot; imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key &quot;HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key &quot;Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)&quot; imported
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key &quot;Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key &quot;Brennan Novak (Qubes Website &amp;amp; Documentation Signing)&quot; imported
gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key &quot;Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key &quot;Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key &quot;Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key &quot;unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key &quot;Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)&quot; imported
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key &quot;Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)&quot; imported
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: &quot;Qubes Master Signing Key&quot; not changed
gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key &quot;Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key&quot; imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)&quot; imported
gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key &quot;Qubes OS Security Team&quot; imported
gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key &quot;Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)&quot; imported
gpg: Total number processed: 17
gpg:               imported: 16
gpg:              unchanged: 1
gpg: marginals needed: 3  completes needed: 1  trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0  valid:   1  signed:   6  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
gpg: depth: 1  valid:   6  signed:   0  trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Verify signed Git tags.&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;nb&quot;&gt;cd &lt;/span&gt;qubes-secpack/
&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;git tag &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;-v&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class=&quot;sb&quot;&gt;`&lt;/span&gt;git describe&lt;span class=&quot;sb&quot;&gt;`&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
type commit
tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
   
Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;

    &lt;p&gt;The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg: Good signature from...&lt;/code&gt; followed by an appropriate key. The &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;[full]&lt;/code&gt; indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:&lt;/p&gt;

    &lt;div class=&quot;language-shell_session highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;nb&quot;&gt;cd &lt;/span&gt;QSBs/
&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--verify&lt;/span&gt; qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--verify&lt;/span&gt; qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;nb&quot;&gt;cd&lt;/span&gt; ../canaries/
&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--verify&lt;/span&gt; canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;gp&quot;&gt;$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;w&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;gpg &lt;span class=&quot;nt&quot;&gt;--verify&lt;/span&gt; canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
&lt;span class=&quot;go&quot;&gt;gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
gpg: Good signature from &quot;Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)&quot; [full]
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;

    &lt;p&gt;Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg --verify&lt;/code&gt; command should always start with &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;gpg: Good signature from...&lt;/code&gt; followed by an appropriate key.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For this announcement (QSB-121), the commands are:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;pre class=&quot;highlight&quot;&gt;&lt;code&gt;$ gpg --verify qsb-121-2026.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-121-2026.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-121-2026.txt.sig.simon qsb-121-2026.txt
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-121 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
        <link>https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/03/qsb-121/</link>
        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/03/qsb-121/</guid>
        
        
        <category>security</category>
        
      </item>
    
      <item>
        <title>Fedora 43 approaching end of life</title>
        <description>&lt;p&gt;Fedora 43 is currently &lt;a href=&quot;https://fedorapeople.org/groups/schedule/f-43/f-43-key-tasks.html&quot;&gt;scheduled&lt;/a&gt; to reach &lt;a href=&quot;https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life&quot;&gt;end of life (EOL)&lt;/a&gt; on 2026-12-09 (approximately one month from the date of this announcement). Please upgrade all of your Fedora templates and standalones by that date. For more information, see &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html#upgrading-to-avoid-eol&quot;&gt;Upgrading to avoid EOL&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Recommended:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/templates/fedora/fedora.html#installing&quot;&gt;Install a new template to replace an existing one.&lt;/a&gt; This option is simpler for less experienced users, but it won’t preserve any modifications you’ve made to your template. After you install the new template, you’ll have to redo your desired template modifications (if any) and &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/templates/templates.html#switching&quot;&gt;switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template&lt;/a&gt;. If you choose to modify your template, you may wish to write those modifications down so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the old Fedora template and use the &lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;dnf history&lt;/code&gt; command.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Advanced:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/templates/fedora/fedora-upgrade.html&quot;&gt;Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template.&lt;/a&gt; This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/supported-releases.html#note-on-dom0-and-eol&quot;&gt;note on dom0 and EOL&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
        <pubDate>Sun, 01 Nov 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
        <link>https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/01/fedora-43-approaching-end-of-life/</link>
        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/11/01/fedora-43-approaching-end-of-life/</guid>
        
        
        <category>announcements</category>
        
      </item>
    
      <item>
        <title>Qubes OS Summit 2026 starts today!</title>
        <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://pretix.eu/qubes/summit2026/&quot;&gt;Qubes OS Summit 2026&lt;/a&gt; is finally here! Today, Friday, October 30, marks the first day of the Summit, which will begin at 9:30am CET (UTC+1) in Berlin, Germany. Whether you’re joining us in person at &lt;a href=&quot;https://refugio.berlin/&quot;&gt;Refugio Berlin&lt;/a&gt; or &lt;a href=&quot;https://streaming.media.ccc.de/qubes_os/main&quot;&gt;online via the livestream&lt;/a&gt;, we’re excited for you to see the &lt;a href=&quot;https://pretalx.com/qubes-os-summit-2026/schedule/&quot;&gt;presentations&lt;/a&gt; our speakers have prepared for you!&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Still need a ticket, or not sure if you do? There are three ways to attend the Summit:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;In person at &lt;a href=&quot;https://refugio.berlin/&quot;&gt;Refugio Berlin&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;
    &lt;ul&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;Requires a &lt;a href=&quot;https://pretix.eu/qubes/summit2026/&quot;&gt;paid on-site ticket&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;Grants access to the hackathon (including interactive workshops) and any design sessions (depending on conference schedule)&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;Provides the opportunity to socialize, network, and mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;Grants exclusive access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;Grants access to attend presentations and participate as a live audience member&lt;/li&gt;
    &lt;/ul&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Actively participate &lt;a href=&quot;https://streaming.media.ccc.de/qubes_os/main&quot;&gt;online&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;
    &lt;ul&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;Requires a &lt;a href=&quot;https://pretix.eu/qubes/summit2026/&quot;&gt;free virtual ticket&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;For those who are presenting remotely&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;For those who are attending presentations remotely and wish to ask questions or engage in active discussion in the Matrix room (&lt;code class=&quot;language-plaintext highlighter-rouge&quot;&gt;#qubes-summit:matrix.org&lt;/code&gt;) during the presentations&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member&lt;/li&gt;
    &lt;/ul&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Passively view &lt;a href=&quot;https://streaming.media.ccc.de/qubes_os/main&quot;&gt;online&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;
    &lt;ul&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;No ticket or registration required&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;For those who simply wish to watch the presentations via the public live stream and recorded videos&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;Does not provide the ability to ask questions or engage in active discussion during the presentations&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;li&gt;Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member&lt;/li&gt;
    &lt;/ul&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Note:&lt;/strong&gt; As mentioned above, presenters have the option to request that their presentations not be recorded. If a presenter opts out of recording, there will be a “no recording” icon next to that presentation in the conference schedule. Only on-site attendees will be able to view that presentation. It will not be livestreamed or recorded for later viewing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;when-and-where&quot;&gt;When and where&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Friday, October 30 @ 9:30 AM — Sunday, November 1 @ 3:00 PM (GMT+1)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://refugio.berlin/&quot;&gt;Refugio Berlin&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Lenaustraße 3-4&lt;br /&gt;
12047 Berlin&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.openstreetmap.org/way/263350430&quot;&gt;View on OpenStreetMap&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Livestream:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://streaming.media.ccc.de/qubes_os/main&quot;&gt;https://streaming.media.ccc.de/qubes_os/main&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;thank-you-to-our-sponsors&quot;&gt;Thank you to our sponsors&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;We’re grateful to our sponsors for making Qubes OS Summit 2026 possible!&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3 id=&quot;gold-tier-sponsor&quot;&gt;Gold-tier sponsor&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://freedom.press/&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/attachment/site/fpf-logo.svg&quot; alt=&quot;Freedom of the Press Foundation logo&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://freedom.press/&quot;&gt;Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF)&lt;/a&gt; is a long-standing &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.qubes-os.org/partners/&quot;&gt;Qubes Partner&lt;/a&gt;. As a nonprofit organization, it is dedicated to supporting and defending public interest journalism. It leads the development of &lt;a href=&quot;https://securedrop.org/&quot;&gt;SecureDrop&lt;/a&gt;, an open-source whistleblower submission platform used by more than 50 media organizations around the world to securely accept documents from anonymous sources. FPF uses Qubes OS in the development of an integrated &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-workstation&quot;&gt;SecureDrop Workstation&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3 id=&quot;silver-tier-sponsors&quot;&gt;Silver-tier sponsors&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://novacustom.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/attachment/site/novacustom-logo.png&quot; alt=&quot;NovaCustom logo&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://novacustom.com/&quot;&gt;NovaCustom&lt;/a&gt; builds custom laptops, mini PCs, and smartphones with a focus on privacy, security, and customization. They offer the freedom of Dasharo coreboot firmware, true repairability, and a plethora of customization options. Several NovaCustom models are &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/hardware/certified-hardware/certified-hardware.html&quot;&gt;officially certified for Qubes OS&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nitrokey.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/attachment/site/nitrokey-logo.svg&quot; alt=&quot;Nitrokey logo&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nitrokey.com/&quot;&gt;Nitrokey&lt;/a&gt; is a world leader in open-source security hardware. They develop hardware for data encryption, key management, user authentication, network devices, desktops, laptops, and smartphones. Several NitroPads and NitroPCs are &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/hardware/certified-hardware/certified-hardware.html&quot;&gt;officially certified for Qubes OS&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;code-of-conduct&quot;&gt;Code of conduct&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This event is covered by the Qubes OS Project’s &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/introduction/code-of-conduct.html&quot;&gt;code of conduct&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
        <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
        <link>https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/30/qubes-os-summit-2026-starts-today/</link>
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        <category>announcements</category>
        
      </item>
    
      <item>
        <title>The Star Labs StarFighter is Qubes certified!</title>
        <description>&lt;p&gt;It is our pleasure to announce that the &lt;a href=&quot;https://starlabs.systems/pages/starfighter&quot;&gt;Star Labs StarFighter&lt;/a&gt; is &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/hardware/certified-hardware/certified-hardware.html&quot;&gt;officially certified&lt;/a&gt; for Qubes OS Release 4!&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;the-star-labs-starfighter&quot;&gt;The Star Labs StarFighter&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href=&quot;https://starlabs.systems/pages/starfighter&quot;&gt;Star Labs StarFighter&lt;/a&gt; is a 16-inch laptop featuring open-source coreboot firmware, disabled Intel ME, up to 64 GB of memory, wireless kill switch, removable webcam, as well as extensive firmware controls for fan, power, security, boot behavior, and more.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://starlabs.systems/pages/starfighter&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/attachment/site/starlabs-starfighter.png&quot; alt=&quot;Photo of Star Labs StarFighter&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;qubes-certified-options&quot;&gt;Qubes-certified options&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The configuration options required for Qubes certification are detailed below.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3 id=&quot;base-configuration&quot;&gt;Base Configuration&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Certified: Standard (Intel Core Ultra 5 125H + 32GB LPDDR5X + QHD display)&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Certified: Ultra (Intel Core Ultra 9 285H + 64GB LPDDR5X + 4K display)&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;The AMD configuration is not certified.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Warning:&lt;/strong&gt; While both the QHD and 4K display variants will work, the 4K display will run at a lower resolution (Full HD) due to the absence of proper support for HiDPI in Qubes OS. While users can manually change the resolution to 4K, we cannot guarantee everything will work properly. For example, there are known issues with both UI scaling and full-screen video playback performance in 4K. This limitation may be lifted in a future Qubes OS release.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h3 id=&quot;operating-system&quot;&gt;Operating System&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Certified: Qubes OS 4.3.2 or newer (within Release 4).&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Releases older than 4.3.2 are not certified.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;You may choose either to have Star Labs preinstall Qubes OS for you, or you may choose to install Qubes OS yourself. This choice does not affect certification.&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h3 id=&quot;storage--additional-storage&quot;&gt;Storage &amp;amp; Additional Storage&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;Certified: All of the available options in these sections&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;disclaimers&quot;&gt;Disclaimers&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;As mentioned above, while both the QHD and 4K display variants will work, the 4K display will run at a lower resolution (Full HD) due to the absence of proper support for HiDPI in Qubes OS. While users can manually change the resolution to 4K, we cannot guarantee everything will work properly. For example, there are known issues with both UI scaling and full-screen video playback performance in 4K. This limitation may be lifted in a future Qubes OS release.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2 id=&quot;what-is-qubes-certified-hardware&quot;&gt;What is Qubes-certified hardware?&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/hardware/certified-hardware/certified-hardware.html&quot;&gt;Qubes-certified hardware&lt;/a&gt; is hardware that has been certified by the Qubes developers as compatible with a specific &lt;a href=&quot;/doc/version-scheme/&quot;&gt;major release&lt;/a&gt; of Qubes OS. All Qubes-certified devices are available for purchase with Qubes OS preinstalled. Beginning with Qubes 4.0, in order to achieve certification, the hardware must satisfy a rigorous set of &lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/hardware/certified-hardware/certified-hardware.html#hardware-certification-requirements&quot;&gt;requirements&lt;/a&gt;, and the vendor must commit to offering customers the very same configuration (same motherboard, same screen, same BIOS version, same Wi-Fi module, etc.) for at least one year.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/hardware/certified-hardware/certified-hardware.html#qubes-certified-computers&quot;&gt;Qubes-certified computers&lt;/a&gt; are specific models that are regularly tested by the Qubes developers to ensure compatibility with all of Qubes’ features. The developers test all new major versions and updates to ensure that no regressions are introduced.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It is important to note, however, that Qubes hardware certification certifies only that a particular hardware &lt;em&gt;configuration&lt;/em&gt; is &lt;em&gt;supported&lt;/em&gt; by Qubes. The Qubes OS Project takes no responsibility for any vendor’s manufacturing, shipping, payment, or other practices, nor can we control whether physical hardware is modified (whether maliciously or otherwise) &lt;em&gt;en route&lt;/em&gt; to the user.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
        <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
        <link>https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/21/starlabs-starfighter-qubes-certified/</link>
        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/10/21/starlabs-starfighter-qubes-certified/</guid>
        
        
        <category>announcements</category>
        
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